Constitutional Common Law of Treaty Interpretation: A Reply to the Formalists by Trimble, Phillip R.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON LAW OF TREATY
INTERPRETATION:
A REPLY TO THE FORMALISTS
PHILLIP R. TRIMBLEt
If hard cases make bad law, then the ABM Treaty reinterpreta-
tion controversy demonstrates the opposite corollary: easy cases make
good law. Moreover, far from representing a "constitutional crisis," as
suggested by Senate opponents of the ABM Treaty reinterpretation and
by Professor Koplow, the controversy actually demonstrates another op-
posite corollary: substantive law conflict between the President and the
Senate represents a constitutionally appropriate process to produce con-
stitutional law. The clash between the President and Congress was not
a constitutional crisis, but rather a good example of how constitutional
common law is formed in the area of foreign affairs and separation of
powers.
One may not have gathered this perception by following the debate
and focusing on the views of the principal protagonists. Senator Biden
opened the Senate hearings by proclaiming a "constitutional crisis" and
by staking out a position denying presidential power to reinterpret a
treaty under certain circumstances. On behalf of the Reagan Adminis-
tration, Judge Sofaer responded with an opposing position, but he also
conceded an absence of presidential power to reinterpret a treaty under
certain, apparently narrower, circumstances. Professor Koplow pro-
poses yet another set of circumstances under which presidential power
to reinterpret a treaty would be denied, determined by balancing eight
factors. He argues that "[i]f, on balance, one concludes that the original
interpretation has - via the operation of these eight factors - become
"entrenched" in domestic law, then the President may not unilaterally
depart from it. . . .and it can be changed only by a subsequent law-
making activity that is of equal stature under the Constitution."1 These
three positions are different, but they have much more in common than
one might gather in the midst of the rhetorical storm. All the protago-
nists accept the notion that, under some circumstances, a "correct" in-
terpretation of a treaty can be frozen at the time the Senate gave its
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advice and consent to ratification. Thus they all share a fundamental
- and fundamentally false - conception of law and legal develop-
ment. It is called "entrenchment," and it portrays this part of treaty
law as a set of static legal rules, unchanged in meaning from their in-
ception, and unchangeable except through the same formal process that
produced the rules in the first place. That view of law is not consistent
with other, examples of law and legal development. Law changes in
response to new circumstances, and the "correct" interpretation of a
treaty is no exception.
The more important question is how entrenched rules, even if they
existed, could change. Indeed the question of "entrenchment" of law
and the process of legal change cannot be separated. Yet in the debate
about the constitutional principles governing the ABM Treaty interpre-
tation, the protagonists did not discuss the process of change and did
not recognize the potential role of congressional acquiesence as a legiti-
mating process equal to formal Senate consent or a statute.
Senator Biden was clear: an entrenched rule can only be changed
by the same formal process by which it was created, consent by two-
thirds of the Senate.' The Biden Resolution subsequently was amended
to acknowledge that an entrenched rule could be changed by statute.'
Sofaer did not seem to address the question at all. Koplow acknowl-
edges that the President would not be "estopped" from reinterpreting
an entrenched term, that the "meaning of a treaty . . . remains free to
evolve over time as circumstances warrant,"" and even that constitu-
tional principles "do not require that the meaning of a treaty must be
permanently frozen until a subsequent law-making activity fulfilling
the requirements of bicameralism and presentment explicitly supercedes
it."5 But his conclusion, quoted above, seems to require formal Senate
or congressional action to legitimate an executive reinterpretation of an
entrenched meaning.
Like other participants in the debate,6 Koplow overlooked the pro-
2 See The ABM Treaty and the Constitution, Joint Hearings Before the Senate
Foreign Relations Comm. and the Senate Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1987) [hereinafter as Hearings].
3 See S. Res. 167, reprinted in SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., THE ABM
TREATY INTERPRETATION RESOLUTION, S. REP. No. 164, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 117
(1987) [hereinafter ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION REPORT].
4 Koplow, supra note 1, at 1426.
5 Id. at 1407.
6 See, e.g., Glennon, Interpreting "Interpretation": The President, the Senate,
and When Treaty Interpretation Becomes Treaty-Making, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 913
(1987) (analyzing limits on presidential interpretive power to alter or amend treaties);
Kennedy, Treaty Interpretation by the Executive Branch: The ABM Treaty and "Star
Wars" Testing and Development, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 854 (1986) (arguing that the
Senate's understanding at the time of consent is binding on the President).
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cess of constitutional common law-making that was going on in the
course of the reinterpretation dispute. The process by which the dispute
was resolved - a presidential proposal rejected by the Congress - is a
constitutionally correct procedure for law-making, and the substantive
result - testing of exotic systems in space is not permitted by the
ABM Treaty - was clearly correct. In the senatorial and academic
debate, however, critics of executive power undervalued the role of
presidential initiative in foreign policy law-making, and failed to take
account of the potential role of Senate or congressional acquiescence in
that process. And - somewhat incidentally - they overestimated the
role of the Judiciary at the expense of the common law-making func-
tion of joint executive-congressional interaction and decision-making.
A. Background
When the President sent the ABM Treaty to the Senate for its
advice and consent to ratification, Executive Branch officials told the
Senate that the treaty prohibited the testing in space of exotic ABM
systems (i.e. those based on "other physical principles" than those ex-
isting in 1972, like lasers).7 Thirteen years later the Reagan Adminis-
tration "reinterpreted" the treaty to permit the testing in space of exotic
ABM systems. However, Senator Nunn, supported by former officials
who negotiated the treaty and several academic commentators, thor-
oughly demolished the Administration's case.' The Administration ar-
guments were so weak that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
questioned the good faith of their authors.'
Most of the discussion of this problem in Senate Hearings, in a
report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and on the Senate
floor focused on the substantive merits of the reinterpretation. How-
ever, Senator Biden took the lead in transforming the substantive arms
control treaty question into a constitutional issue. He even urged his
colleagues to treat the constitutional issue as "paramount" over the sub-
stantive, arms control question. °
7 For a summary, see ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK, THE
ANTI-BALLISTIC MissLE TREATY INTERPRETATION DISPuTE (1988).
" See Hearings, supra note 2, at 553-811 (Nunn analysis); Chayes & Chayes,
Testing and Development of "Exotic" Systems Under the ABM Treaty: The Great Re-
interpretation Caper, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1956 (1986) (criticizing the Administration's
reinterpretation as violating both the letter and spirit of the Treaty and professional
responsibility); Garthoff, History Confirms the Traditional Meaning, ARMS CONTROL
TODAY, at 15 (April 1987); Rhinelander & Ruben, Mission Accomplished, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, at 3 (Sept. 1987).
9 See ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION REPORT, supra note 3, at 62.
10 See Hearings, supra note 2, at 116.
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B. The Constitutional Debate and Its False Formal Entrenchment
Assumption
Senator Biden introduced the ABM Treaty Interpretation Resolu-
tion ("S. Res. 167") on March 11, 1987, and convened a Joint Hear-
ing of the Senate Judiciary and Foreign Relations Committees the
same day. S. Res. 167 provided that "during the period in which a
treaty is in force, the meaning of that treaty is what the Senate under-
stands the treaty to mean when it gives its advice and consent . .. .""
In his opening statement at the hearing Senator Biden explained that
"during the life of the treaty the Constitution permits . . .only that
interpretation [as presented by the executive branch and as understood
by the Senate], unless the treaty is formally amended with the advice
and consent of the Senate."' 2 Consequently, S. Res. 167 reflected a
stark assertion of formal entrenchment. In support of the effort to pre-
vent the President from reinterpreting the ABM Treaty to permit test-
ing exotic ABM systems in space, S. Res. 167 would have frozen all
treaty interpretations "as understood by the Senate" at the time of con-
sent to ratification; the President could not suggest differently unless he
received a new, formal Senate consent (presumably by an affirmative
vote of two-thirds of the Senators present).
The Reagan Administration responded with the Sofaer Doctrine.
According to this Doctrine, a particular interpretation would become
entrenched if it were "authoritatively shared with, and clearly intended,
generally understood and relied upon by, the Senate at the time of its
advice and consent to ratification."'" The Sofaer conditions for en-
trenchment clearly were intended to be more difficult to meet, thereby
giving the Executive more latitude, but the concepts are so vague under
both S. Res. 167 and the Sofaer Doctrine that it is far from clear that
the two formulations would necessarily produce different results in
practice. "Generally understood" and "understood" are not necessarily
different. Any formal communication to the Senate could easily be re-
garded by an interpreter to be "clearly intended" to contribute to the
Senate's understanding. And any statement received from the Executive
in a Senate hearing could reasonably be presumed to be "relied upon."
" S. Res. 167, § 2(2)(A), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 2, at 230. The re-
maining relevant provisions of S. Res. 167 said that, in the absence of any Senate
understanding on a particular point, the treaty is properly interpreted by a reference to
the "text, as reasonably construed, in light of its object and purpose." Id. at 230.
12 Hearings, supra note 2, at 116.
iS SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., THE INF TREATY, S. ExEc. REP. No.
15, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 443 (1988) [hereinafter INF REPORT] (Culvahouse letter);
see also 134 CONG. REc. S6740-44 (daily ed. May 26, 1988) (Sofaer speech).
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Indeed, Senator Nunn recognized that the two tests were not far
apart,' 4 but most protagonists in the debate underestimated the indeter-
minate quality of the concepts involved.
Koplow offers eight factors to balance in determining whether a
meaning is entrenched. 15 To some extent they cover the same ground as
S. Res. 167 and the Sofaer Doctrine. Thus "what the Senate said,"
"what was said to the Senate," and "support for the old and new inter-
pretations in the treaty text and record" (factors one, two, and four)
seem similar to the concept of a Senate "understanding" that it "relied
on." Factors six and seven focus on the magnitude of the change in
interpretations, but seem only to add to the vagueness and manipulabil-
ity of the inquiry (for which Koplow criticizes Sofaer). In any case
likely to be contested, the Koplow factors would seem to make it easier
for resourceful lawyers to support a preferred result.
The most problematic of Koplow's factors are the proposed use of
subsequent practice, the agreement of the other party to the proposed
reinterpretation, and changed circumstances. These are factors that
only could occur after a meaning has been entrenched. As indicated,
entrenchment occurs when the Senate votes to consent to ratification of
the treaty. If Koplow's last three factors are relevant - as they surely
are - it is difficult to see how any meaning could ever be assuredly
entrenched. A meaning could only be tentatively entrenched. Although
the inclusion of these factors is clearly a sensible approach, it shows up
the vacuity of the intellectual framework in which this part of the de-
bate was conducted.
Despite persistent efforts by Senator Biden and his allies to secure
Senate endorsement of some form of the entrenchment principle, the
Senate declined to do so - for perfectly good reasons. The notion that
a legal rule - whether it is a constitutional provision, a contract term,
or a treaty interpretation - can be fixed or "entrenched," subject to
change only by formal process, is clearly unsound. The idea of en-
trenchment, based on the shared understanding of the Executive
Branch and the Senate, is closely related to the nostalgic appeal to
"original intent" as a way of ascertaining the meaning of the Constitu-
tion, and is subject to the same criticism. First, there are many intents
behind the actions of a collective deliberative body, and most partici-
pants in the deliberation are silent. For example, during the later con-
stitutional debate over treaty interpretation on the Senate floor, when
the successor'to S. Res. 167 was considered, only twenty-two Senators
4 See 134 CONG. REC. S6778-89 (daily ed. May 26, 1988).
'5 See Koplow, supra note 1, at 1419-25.
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spoke.'" Fourteen endorsed the entrenchment provision but reflected
three different views of its import. We do not know the views of the
silent majority. It would not be implausible to believe that at least some
intended that their intent not govern future interpretations.' 7 Given the
number of participants in the deliberative process of treaty considera-
tion by the Senate, it is often difficult to infer a single, coherent inter-
pretation. Moreover, even if it were possible to make inferences from
the statements of a few Senators, the interpreter can manipulate the
result by varying the level of generality to which she takes the infer-
ence. Finally, as a practical matter, reference to the statements of one
Senator, even a floor manager, can frequently be refuted by some other
authoritative source. In the end the interpreter must choose which of
the conflicting considerations to emphasize.
Under the standard canons of legislative history, however, the
statement of a floor manager, arranged colloquies, and committee re-
ports can eliminate the problem of multiple voices and seem to provide
a coherent explanation of meaning. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by
the debate over the successor to S. Res. 167, the single voice of the
floor manager may not cover important points, may be internally in-
consistent, and may even speak to a position not in fact embodied in the
document before the Senate. Finally, the committee's reports are writ-
ten by staff and are probably read by few, if any, Senators.
In view of the problems outlined above in divining legislative "in-
tent" or a shared Senate understanding of a treaty meaning, the best
measure of Senate intent is what it actually voted on. The meaning of
what the Senate approved can be especially illuminated by comparing
the approved version with proposals that a measure's proponents would
like the Senate to have voted on, but were modified to attract the neces-
sary votes for passage. The treaty interpretation debate showed that the
Senate itself did not accept the general notion of formal entrenchment
embodied in S. Res. 167 and the related Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Report.
In the hearings, the original language of S. Res. 167 was criti-
16 For a review of the debate, see 134 CONG. REc. S6724-83 (daily ed. May 26,
1988). The Senate subsequently debated and rejected an amendment proposed by Sena-
tor Specter that would have codified the Sofaer Doctrine. See 134 CONG. REC. S6884-
90 (daily ed. May 27, 1988).
17 Cf Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Understanding of Origi-
nal Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985) (analyzing and questioninfg the claim that
the Constitution's Framers wrote it anticipating that future interpretations would rely
on their original intent); Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1127 (1987) (arguing that the Framers' expected future interpretations to pre-
serve natural law were not expressly mentioned in the written Constitution).
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cized on legal grounds by Senators Lugar and Helms and by two pri-
vate commentators."" The private commentators specifically argued that
interpretations may change over time, in response to new conditions
and subsequent practice. Both private commentators called attention to
the role of Senate acceptance of subsequent practice as a way of legiti-
mating a reinterpretation. S. Res. 167 as reported reflected a signifi-
cant change from the original formal entrenchment assumption. It pro-
vided that the meaning of a treaty provision "is to be determined in
light of what the Senate understands the treaty to mean when it gives
its advice and consent."' 19 The Committee Report, however, clung to
the original entrenchment idea, asserting that "the meaning of the
treaty that the President ratifies is the meaning on which there existed
a meeting of the minds between the President and the Senate at the
time of Senate consent."2 It quoted former Chairman Fulbright to the
effect that "a law means what its framers intended it to mean and not
what a later generation of policy makers would like it to mean . ..."
Senator Helms, on the other hand, characterized this part of the
Committee Report as an attempt to "rewrite constitutional law. '22 He
explained that "[s]ubsequent practice gives to the Chief Executive the
right to adjust the implementation of a treaty. '23
Both views are wrong. No meaning of a treaty, contract, or law is
fixed forever but, contrary to Senator Helms, the President cannot uni-
laterally reinterpret a treaty. Formal Senate action is not necessary, but
Senate acquiescence is.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to report
S. Res. 167, as amended, favorably by a vote of 11-8.24 Since the Res-
olution dealt with the substantive law of the ABM treaty as well as
with the constitutional law of treaty interpretation, it is impossible to
know whether some Senators may have agreed with the initial interpre-
tation of the ABM Treaty, but may have disagreed with (or may have
not had a view on) the constitutional principles contained in the Reso-
lution, or vice versa. Such are the vagaries of legislative intent. In any
event, the Senate did not take action on the Resolution, but Congress
did - informally - frustrate the Reagan reinterpretation of the ABM
18 See Hearings, supra note 2, at 180-81 (Senator Helms); id. at 182-83 (Senator
Lugar); id. at 86-87 (Professor Baldwin); id. at 192-95 (Mr. Rovine).
19 ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION REPORT, supra note 3, at 117 (emphasis
added).
20 Id. at 39.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 69
23 Id.
24 See id. at 37. A Helms substitute motion failed by a vote of 9-10.
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Treaty by limiting appropriations for SDI. Thus, Congress imposed its
view of the substantive law of the ABM Treaty, but did not express its
view on the constitutional principles of treaty interpretation. The Sen-
ate inaction was apparently part of a political compromise under which
the Reagan Administration agreed to conform to the narrow interpreta-
tion of the ABM Treaty and the Senate agreed to "temporarily forego
legislation that endorses the restrictive view of the treaty."25 By declin-
ing to act on the Foreign Relations Committee recommendation, the
Senate laid the foundation for a negative implication; it did not wish to
endorse the constitutional law principles embodied in S. Res. 167, as
amended.
The Biden Resolution, S. Res. 167, and the issue of entrench-
ment, however, were not dead. In connection with the popular INF
Treaty, the proponents of S. Res. 167 found a new opportunity to
press the issue. The Biden Resolution, S. Res. 167, was revived as a
proposed condition to the INF Treaty.26 The Biden Condition embod-
ied the old entrenchment principles: the United States shall not agree to
an interpretation of a treaty different from the original understanding
except by formal Senate consent. The purpose of the Biden Condition
was "to articulate and affirm . . . constitutional principles" that "re-
flect long-standing constitutional practice."'27 The Biden Condition was
directed "to the maximum degree possible" to the INF Treaty, but it
was also designed to "affirm principles that inherently apply to the
INF Treaty,"2" The Committee responded to the objection that the
Senate cannot change the Constitution by a unilateral resolution or
condition by stating that it was necessary in the context to register its
non-acquiescence to the Sofaer Doctrine. Thus the Biden Condition,
"paradoxically . . . [was] both unnecessary and highly significant."2 9
The Biden Condition specifically provided that the INF Treaty
"shall be subject to the following principles, which derive, as necessary
implications, from the provisions of the Constitution (Article II, section
2, clause 2) for the making of treaties . . . ." The Committee's at-
tempt to secure Senate approval of this general statement of constitu-
tional law was once again unsuccessful. On the floor of the Senate, a
25 A. Gordon, Nunn says Record on the ABM Pact is Being Distorted, N. Y.
Times, Mar. 12, 1987, at Al, col. 4.
26 See INF REPORT, supra note 13, at 97, 436.
27 Id. at 96.
28 Id. at 97 (emphasis in original).
29 Id.
'o Id. The Condition then set forth the original entrenchment principles of
S. Res. 167.
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substitute condition, now called the Byrd amendment,3 ' deleted the lan-
guage quoted above that indicated that the entrenchment principles
were general principles of constitutional law. Instead, entrenchment
principles were applied as a condition to the INF Treaty, and were by
their terms limited to that treaty.
The change was intentional and significant. During the Foreign
Relations Committee deliberations, Senator Cranston, who took over
leadership of this issue in the absence of Senator Biden, proposed three
versions of the Biden Condition to Senator Lugar. Lugar rejected all
three. Cranston then "introduced the toughest of the three, including
the claim of constitutional authority, giving himself room to negotiate
when the treaty reached the full Senate." 2 As the debate on the Senate
floor moved toward consideration of amendments and conditions,
"Cranston said that he and Pell would be willing to remove the refer-
ence to constitutional authority from the language."33 This is exactly
what happened. The entrenchment provisions embodied in the Condi-
tion were no longer said to "derive, as necessary implications, from the
provisions of the Constitution." Instead, the Senate adopted a "condi-
tion, based on the Treaty Clauses of the Constitution," to the effect that
the original understanding of the INF Treaty - and only that Treaty
- would be entrenched. 4 Once again, the Senate deliberately - and
as part of a political compromise - declined to endorse the general
"consitutional principles" embodied in S. Res. 167 and the Biden
Condition. Nevertheless, despite the language change, several Senators
in the floor debate maintained that the revised Condition would still
have the effect of making a general statement about constitutional law;
in other words, a statement in favor of formal entrenchment.3 5 That
view, however, was not the only view expressed by supporters of the
Byrd amendment, and it is therefore not necessarily indicative of Senate
intent. Fourteen Senators spoke in favor of the Byrd amendment. Eight
interpreted the amendment to represent a general statement, while two
others seemed to accept that it had no effect beyond the INF Treaty.
Other supporters did not address the question. There obviously was no
31 See 134 CONG. REc. S6724 (daily ed. May 26, 1988).
11 Abramson, Democrats Ready to Compromise on Key INF Issue, Cranston Says,
L.A. Times, May 20, 1988, pt. 1 at 16, col. 1.
33 Id.
"' The reference to the Treaty Clauses of the Constitution may still seem ambigu-
ous. Literally it could either mean that the substance of the Condition was based on
constitutional law, or it could mean that the Senate's action - procedurally - was
based on the Constitution. Since the former would render the language change mean-
ingless, the latter seems correct.
'5 See supra note 15.
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single view among the supporters who spoke as to the correct meaning
or message of the Byrd amendment.
Only two Senators directly addressed the effect of the language
change from the original Biden Condition. Senator Lugar, who both
participated in the discussions leading to the compromise language in
the amendment and voted for the amendment, offered the following
view:
I rise to ask Senators to vote for the Byrd substitute. I
do so having participated in the discussions with the distin-
guished majority leader, with colleagues on both sides of the
aisle representing the Foreign Relations, Armed Services,
and Intelligence Committees, and of course, our Republican
leader, Senator Dole... . I hoped this particular amendment
would not be necessary on the INF Treaty. Indeed, I de-
scribed the entire operation as a mistake, in my judgment. I
suspect that each one of us tries to determine what is relative
and what is important, and it is apparent to me that a num-
ber of colleagues believe this matter is very important. In-
deed, the majority leader has pointed out that in his judg-
ment the role of the Senate in the treaty-making process is
the most important factor superseding even perhaps the
treaty we are discussing.
I would say Mr. President, that my judgment about
these matters is somewhat reversed. I come to a conclusion of
support for this amendment because I believe the INF
Treaty is very important, and it is apparent to me that the
passage of this treaty would have been difficult within the
time period which we are talking about without accommoda-
tion of colleagues listening to one another .... "
Senator Dole, another participant in the compromise discussions and a
reluctant supporter of the amendment, echoed similar sentiments:
As I have discovered over the years, there are about
three ways in this body to deal with disagreements.
We can argue and argue, ad infinitum; and produce lit-
tle but an especially fat edition of the Congressional Record.
Or we can put down our honest differences in pretty stark
form, and then vote-up or down, winner take all.
Or, finally, we can look for compromise. It seemed to
me after several hours of meetings that was our only real
1S 134 CONG. REC. S6771 (daily ed. May 26, 1988).
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choice, if we wanted to get this treaty done, without a truly
dangerous and damaging amendment attached to it ...
I want to correct any misunderstanding. The White
House is not supporting this compromise. . . . They wanted
some changes. They wanted some changes we did not give.
Some of the changes were made: compromise.
So I think if I had my way this amendment would not
be on this treaty. I do not think it even belongs here. But I
know who is in the majority and I know where the votes are
and I knew that the majority leader felt strongly about this
issue on one side. Many others felt strongly on the other
side ...
And so we did the best we could. The result, to me per-
sonally, is far from the best solution; again, I suggest that I
am not the constitutional scholar. But to me, sincerely, it is
the best we can achieve.
We ended up with a better result than we started with.
The majority leader and others on that side were willing to
make some concessions. I think one key provision and one
addition was what we call subsection (4). ...
That provision makes clear, at least it does to me, that
the decision we are making on this treaty applies solely to
this treaty and does not prejudice our position on the ABM
interpretation issue at all. ...
It is my understanding, based on the conversations -
and I do not believe I missed much of any of the meetings,
that was pretty well the feeling of most participants, Repub-
licans and Democrats - that was the effect of that
subsection (4).37
Perhaps significantly, in his response to the Dole statement that con-
cluded the debate, Senator Byrd focused his constitutional arguments on
the INF Treaty alone.38
In the debate, therefore, there was no single or clear explanation
of the language change. Many voices spoke. Some continued to see an
affirmation of general constitutional principles. Others viewed the de-
bate as another version of the ABM Treaty dispute. Still others op-
posed the general principles embodied in the original Biden Condition,
but went along with the compromise in order to get the INF Treaty
approved in time for the Moscow summit. Even supporters of the origi-
.7 Id. at S6781-82.
38 See id. at S6782-83.
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nal Condition were willing to give up Senate endorsement of general
constitutional principles in order to avoid delaying the INF Treaty, a
politically untenable position for arms control supporters. Hence the
compromise referred to by Senators Lugar and Dole. The most plausi-
ble inference is that the Senate decided to avoid a general constitutional
statement. They entrenched the original understanding of the INF
Treaty, but did nothing else. 9
Unfortunately the debate did not reflect much discussion of the
related question of how an entrenched meaning can change. Only Sena-
tor Lugar spoke on this point:
I point out, furthermore, that the checks and balances of
our Government still work, and I appreciate the frustration
of many colleagues on the other side of the aisle who feel
that the current administration has attempted to reinterpret
a treaty. In my own judgment, the current administration
did not attempt to reinterpret treaty. The ambiguity at least
in the ABM Treaty has been cited by the administration as
a basis for interpretation. But let us take the worst case, that
the current administration deliberately took a look at a pro-
position that both the Senate and the President had looked at
and went entirely in a different direction. In truth, Mr.
President, we have in front of us the actual political history
of the past 2 years, and that is the majority party in the
Senate has not agreed with the interpretation of the Presi-
dent of the United States of how we ought to develop the
SDI program, and as a result that program has either been
stymied or has been tailored to fit the will of the majority.
Now, I have not agreed with the tailoring or the stymie-
ing, but nevertheless, I recognize that in our political system
this is the way it works. In short, even if a President should
attempt to reinterpret a treaty, the checks and balances of the
legislative-executive relationship check any exercise of arbi-
trary judgment or arbitrary authority.
Therefore, Mr. President, I saw no particular reason to
8 The next day Senator Specter offered an amendment to the effect that neither
the Biden Condition, as amended, nor the Foreign Relations Committee Report on the
INF Treaty would change existing constitutional law. That amendment was rejected,
by a vote of 64-33, arguably creating a negative implication that the Senate did seek to
change constitutional law. Nevertheless, the four Senators who spoke in opposition
seemed to regard this amendment merely as a threat to the earlier compromise reached
on the Byrd amendment and as means of reviving the Sofaer doctrine. At least two also
interpreted it as an attempt to elevate the status of international law over the constitu-
tional law of the United States. See id. at S6890-91.
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try to pin all of this down 15 different ways. It seems to me
the system works adequately as it stands . ...'0
C. Formal and Informal Processes of Legal Development
An integral part of the idea of entrenchment was the assumption
that the original, frozen meaning can only be changed by the same for-
mal process that created the norm in the first place. This aspect of the
constitutional debate is the most troubling. It fails to take account of the
informal ways in which legal meaning can change over time. Koplow
acknowledges that law changes over time, but does not address the po-
tential for informal processes of change. It ought not to be controversial
that a legal rule can be changed in content by a method different from
that which produced it originally. The Constitution has been funda-
mentally transformed by legislative action, in opposition to or at vari-
ance with the formal amendment procedure contained in the Constitu-
tion. The legitimating factor was popular acquiescence in the revised
order.4
In addition, the original understanding of the Treaty Power,4
which envisioned Senate consultation prior to the negotiation or conclu-
sion of treaties, was quickly reinterpreted in an informal manner. In
1789, in connection with an upcoming negotiation. President Washing-
ton went before the Senate and asked its advice on a series of specific
negotiating questions. The Senate postponed consideration of all but
one such question to a second session. The procedure was unsatisfac-
tory both to the President and the Senate, and was abandoned. Even
the practice initiated by President Washington of seeking written advice
on particular negotiating questions was abandoned by Washington
before the end of his first Administration. 43 Because Washington pre-
sided at the Constitutional Convention and most Senators participated
in some formal way in the Constitution's preparation or ratification,
the early experience would seem to reflect the original understanding.
The original understanding of the Senate's role in treaty-making,
however, continued to change over time in light of experience. "By
1816 the practice had become established that the Senate's formal par-
ticipation in treaty-making was to approve, approve with conditions, or
40 Id. at S6771.
41 See B. ACKERMAN, DISCOVERING THE CONSTITUTION (forthcoming).
42 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c. 2.
43 See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNA-
TIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. PRT. 98-205,
at 25-34 (Comm. Print 1984).
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disapprove treaties after they had been negotiated by the President or
his representative."44 The lesson is that the original entrenched mean-
ing of a constitutional term can be changed, even over a relatively short
period of time, by subsequent history. Moreover, the process consisted
of executive initiative and senatorial acquiescence. An attempt in 1973
by Senator Hartke to reaffirm the "historic" role of the Senate in
treaty-making by constituting it as a council of advice for that purpose
came to naught in the face of executive constitutional objections.
45
The history of executive agreements also illustrates how practice
can alter the entrenched scope of the Article II treaty power. Against a
lack of original understanding, or even a negative intention,4 the Presi-
dent has used presidential executive agreements to create international
and domestic law. The Supreme Court has legitimated these develop-
ments and has approved the informal, law-making process of presiden-
tial initiative and congressional acquiescence.47
The War Power is another example of an entrenched constitu-
tional meaning that has been changed by informal amendment. It seems
to be accepted that the original understanding of the War Power was
that the United States could only initiate the use of military force by a
declaration of war by Congress, except in some limited circumstances of
self-defense.48 Over time the congressional role was eroded,4 and since
World War II the President has frequently initiated military activities
without such a declaration. Examples include the military action in
Korea, the Dominican Republic, Lebanon, Grenada, and the Persian
Gulf. In 1973 Congress passed the War Powers Resolution to recap-
ture its historic, constitutional role; that is to establish the continuation
of the entrenched meaning of the constitutional provision.5" The Presi-
dent vetoed the Resolution and took the position that it was unconstitu-
tional.5 Subsequent Presidents have disregarded its major limitation,
44 Id. at 36.
41 S. Res. 99, 119 CONG. REC. 7274-75 (1973), was opposed by the Department
of State on the grounds that the consistent practice since Washington had been to con-
sult but not to use the Senate as a "Council of Advise." DIGEST OF UNITED STATES
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 172-76 (A. Rovine ed. 1973).
"I See Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L.
REV. 1 (1972).
47 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
48 See Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1379, 1389 n.34 (1988).
" See Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat,
81 HARV. L. REV. 1771, 1790 (1968).
51 Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 2, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541-48
(1982)).
5' See President's Message to the House of Representatives Returning H.J. Res.
542 Without His Approval, 9 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1285 (Oct. 24, 1973).
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and Congress has not used its legislative or appropriations powers to
reverse the presidential position.52 It is fair to conclude that the consti-
tutional allocation of war powers has been changed, again by presiden-
tial initiative and congressional acquiescence.
The entrenched, original meaning of other legal norms, including
statutory provisions and contract terms, can be similarly amended by
informal process. That process was exactly what was engaged during
the ABM Treaty interpretation controversy. The Treaty had an origi-
nal or arguably entrenched meaning, which the President proposed to
change. In rejecting the presidential initiative through its legislative
power, the Congress confirmed the original meaning, thereby winning
the battle over the substantive law of the ABM Treaty.
On the other hand, the congressional proponents of formal en-
trenchment and curtailment of executive power lost the battle over con-
stitutional principle. The Biden Resolution was first amended and then
abandoned. The Senate did not approve S. Res. 167, S. Res. 167 as
amended, or the Biden Condition as initially proposed. Therefore, the
resulting constitutional common law of treaty interpretation was to re-
ject the general statements of constitutional law embodied in the Biden
Resolution and Condition with their formal entrenchment assumptions.
This clash of constitutional claims, reflected in the debate and the
resulting Senate action or inaction, provide the best available evidence
of constitutional principle in this area. The Judiciary rarely decides
foreign policy-separation of powers cases. The most active decision-
makers are Congress and the Executive Branch. Their interaction and
joint decision reflect a kind of constitutional common law.5" Indeed, in
this respect, the two political branches may properly be viewed as an
52 See Ely, supra note 48, at 1379 (noting that Congress has "lain back, neither
disapproving presidential military ventures nor very explicitly approving them, trusting
the President to take the lead and waiting to see how the war in question played politi-
cally"). See generally, Glennon, The War Powers Resolution Ten Years Later: More
Politics Than Law, 78 AM. J. INT'L. L. 571 (1984) (congressional complacency creates
a serious obstacle to strengthening the Resolution).
51 In the Senate deliberations, see infra text accompanying notes 18-40, several
Senators and commentators indicated that the Supreme Court would or could have the
final word. In fact, the Judiciary does not hear many foreign policy or separation of
powers cases. And historically, some have argued that presidential and congressional
views or questions of constitutional law are entitled to at least equal weight. See L.
FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 3-
5, 235-42 (1988). In any event, most foreign affairs issues are settled by the political
branches, not the Judiciary. Consequently, their decisions, reached through compromise
in the political process, and their opinions, reflected in public debate, should be ac-
corded primary legal significance in this area of law. Cf Glennon, The Use of Custom
in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U.L. REv. 109, 134-47 (1984) (sug-
gesting that courts should examine juridical norms found in political branch acts, notice
and acquiesence in establishing custom as a basis for resolving inter-branch disputes).
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elected judiciary, making decisions on the legally correct boundaries of
separated powers in foreign policy, and being held regularly accounta-
ble to the voters for those decisions. For this reason, the terms of the
debate and the joint decisions reflected in the ultimate disposition of the
Biden Resolution and the Biden Condition are the best evidence of the
current constitutional common law of treaty interpretation.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Professor Koplow
concede that modifications in a treaty may be authorized by statute.54
There is no reason why they may not equally be modified by acquies-
cence. The burden of showing acquiescence may be heavy - the prac-
tical application of this alternative would normally be in cases that are
minor or uncontroversial. But the extensive use of "historic practice" as
a source of authority in general constitutional interpretation shows that
informal amendment processes are legitimate." As Senator Lugar
noted, the reinterpretation controversy showed that "checks and bal-
ances" worked. Indeed, it also showed how the process of treaty rein-
terpretation can work, through presidential initiative and congressional
reaction, whether formal or informal. The most basic conceptual flaw
in the formal entrenchment assumption and in the Senate and academic
debates was to undervalue the importance of presidential initiative.
D. Presidential Power and the Ideology of United States Foreign
Policy
Professor Koplow's analysis is part of a literature that is generally
critical of executive power and advocates congressional recapture of its
"historic" or "proper" constitutional role.5' These attacks on executive
power normally seek to insert congressional participation into the for-
eign policy decision-making process involving decisions such as making
certain national commitments, initiation of military force, authorization
of specific covert intelligence activities, approval of particular arms
sales and nuclear exports, trade retaliation, and, in the case discussed
" See e.g., INF REPORT, supra note 13, at 99. This is another example of
amendment of Article II by informal process. Presidents have concluded major agree-
ments on this basis to such an extent that it is now well established that the two forms
of agreement authorization are constitutionally equivalent. See L.K. JOHNSON, THE
MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 12 (1986).
11 See generally Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (upholding exec-
utive power to suspend claims against foreign nation when Congress acquiesced).
56 See, e.g., T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS (1979)
(discussing the post-Vietnam War shift of foreign policy power from the Executive to
Congress); Ely, supra note 48, Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in For-
eign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255 (1988) (arguing
that the Iran-Contra scandal exemplifies a chronic dysfunction in the structure for the
conduct of present U.S. foreign policy).
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here, treaty interpretation. Most of the attacks grow out of particular
presidential decisions that have gone wrong or have proven otherwise
unpopular and feed on the general mistrust of the Presidency engen-
dered by the Vietnam War and the Watergate debacle. Critics of the
Executive believe that by inserting Congress or the Senate earlier into
the presidential decision-making process, they will prevent unwise com-
mitments, wars, embarrassing covert actions, and ill-advised treaty
interpretations.
This approach is wrong for two basic reasons. Most importantly,
the diminution of presidential power sought by the critics would under-
mine important elements of the prevailing ideology of United States
foreign policy.57 Without realizing it, the critics of presidential power
are implicitly attacking the vision of American world leadership that is
fundamental to the national self-image. That leadership would be sig-
nificantly less effective in a world of formal congressional co-determina-
tion of specific decisions in foreign policy. In addition, Congress accepts
this prevailing world leadership ideology and does not want to play the
role that the critics would have it play. Congress is a political body that
recognizes the value of presidential initiative in bolstering the tradi-
tional ideology.
Since the establishment of the Massachusetts colony, the elite who
defined American culture have portrayed America as a unique society
that should serve as an example for the rest of the world to follow. 8
From Winthrop's "city on a hill" sermon through Manifest Destiny
and Wilsonian idealism, the United States has sought to mold other
nations and societies in its own self-image. Infused with a sense of na-
tional greatness, the United States Government has promoted political
liberty and capitalist economics as an integral part of its foreign policy.
Since World War II, this intellectual tradition has been manifested in
the American rhetorical assumption of "leadership of the free world,"
its promotion of "international human rights," and its creation of inter-
national free-market or "open" economic regimes. The leadership/ex-
ample ideology has been reflected in central political, military, eco-
nomic, and social policies of the national government.
In the political sphere, the United States has supported the ad-
vance of democracy through overt and covert means. In face of "com-
munism," the mantle of support even has been extended to many gov-
ernments and movements opposed to revolution regardless of their
57 See generally M. HUNT, IDEOLOGY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1987) (argu-
ing that critics calling for greater restraint in foreign policy pay inadequate attention to
the ideological roots underlying that policy).
58 See W. LAFEBER, THE AMERICAN AGE 9, 19 (1989).'
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actual political system, as long as they could be rhetorically counted as
part of the "free world."59 From the initial authorization of the CIA in
1947, Congress recognized that covert action was an important part of
this strategy, 60 and that the Executive needed the authority to carry out
individual operations, at times and in places of its own choosing, free of
a requirement of specific prior congressional authorization."' Even after
the scandals revealed by the Watergate investigations, Congress de-
clined to require specific advance authorization of particular covert op-
erations. This congressional decision was taken in the face of an execu-
tive claim of implied constitutional foreign affairs power to initiate
covert actions. 62 Consequently, congressional inaction may be taken as
acquiescence in the executive claim. Even after the Iran-Contra scan-
dal, Congress continued to respect the value of presidential initiative
and declined to require advance notice or approval of covert operations.
In the military sphere, the United States "leadership of the free
world" has been buttressed by a series of alliances, bases, and troop
deployments to deter communist aggression and suppress unwelcome
revolutionary activity. The implementation of this policy has required
regular, and often controversial, presidential military action; Congress,
however, has regularly authorized and acquiesced in its use. Even the
War Powers Resolution, which was specifically passed in the aftermath
of the Vietnam War to curtail executive use of military force, has not
effectively curtailed executive initiative. President Nixon vetoed it as
unconstitutional. President Reagan took action inconsistent with its
terms, and Congress declined to enforce it. Again, presidential action
and congressional acquiescence has created a broad constitutional com-
mon law protecting presidential initiative.
On the economic front, Congress has been more direct in support-
ing the presidential initiation function. It authorized American partici-
11 See M. HUNT, supra note 57; see also W. WILLIAMS, THE TRAGEDY OF
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY (1962) (emphasis on economic factors).
60 See National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343, § 102, 61 Stat. 497 (codified at 50
U.S.C. § 403(d)(5) (1982)) (authorizing the Central Intelligence Agency to "perform
such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as
the [NSC] may from time to time direct"); see also W. LAFEBER, supra note 58, at
459.
61 See generally J. OSETH, REGULATING U.S. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS: A
STUDY IN THE DEFINITION OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST (1985) (describing the con-
gressional investigations of the 1970s and the subsequent adoption of permissive notice
requirements for initiating special activities).
62 See Congressional Oversight of Covert Activities, Hearings Before the House
Select Comm. on Intell., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 148-51 (1983); id. at 27-28 (Mr. Colby);
U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: The Performance of the Intelligence Commu-
nity, Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Intell., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1729-38
(1975) (Mr. Rogovin).
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pation through the Executive Branch in the World Bank and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF), and delegated substantial authority to
the President to enable United States participation in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Congress delegated virtu-
ally the entire foreign commerce power to the President under the Ex-
port Administration Act, trade legislation, and the International Emer-
gency Economic Power Act (IEEPA). Most of the congressional
complaints in this area have been based on its perception that the Exec-
utive Branch was not being active enough in defending American do-
mestic interests. Congress has sought more rather than less executive
initiative. Here, Congress also recognized that in the pursuit of United
States economic goals the President needs broad authority to initiate
action.
Culturally, the promotion of human rights has played a critical,
but less criticized, role in carrying out the ideology of example and
leadership. Since the founding of the United Nations, the United States
has promoted western civil and political values as a model for the rest
of the world to follow. In the vacuum created by the failing Nixon
presidency, Congress forced human rights on the specific foreign policy
agenda, but even then it recognized that only presidential action could
translate the general policy into concrete results. Consequently, in the
four major arenas in which American leadership/example ideology
63
has played out, Congress has largely chosen to rely on and respect pres-
idential initiative.
Although treaty interpretation plays a less important role in the
grand scheme of United States foreign policy, it is an integral part of
the day-to-day conduct of foreign relations that is the heart of the Pres-
ident's executive function. 4 To freeze the executive ability to reinter-
"3 In the past decade or so, international interdependence has presented the histor-
ical ideology of American example and leadership with a fundamental new challenge.
This new context of intense world involvement both threatens and stimulates the ideo-
logical self-image of American leadership. Interdependence is threatening because other
nations have become relatively more powerful, heralding a new multi-polar world. The
United States must take account of other nations' interests more regularly. The United
States can no longer lead (or get its own way) in the manner that it used to. But the
ideological self-image of American leadership is stimulated because interdependence re-
quires more government action to defend the American economic, social, and political
interests that the voters increasingly want advanced throughout the world. Interdepen-
dence will create more pressure on Congress to act. But, at the same time, interdepen-
dence requires day-to-day initiatives and responses that frequently can only be made by
the Executive-dealing, for example, with exchange rates, oil supplies, enforcement of
trade agreements, unwanted foreign investment, terrorism and human rights, disaster
relief, nuclear non-proliferation, intifadeh in the West Bank, hostages in Lebanon, in-
surgency in the Sudan, and regrettably, military crises. Effective action to sustain some
measure of American leadership will continue to require presidential initiative.
" I am not arguing that executive power to interpret or reinterpret treaties is an
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pret treaties in some circumstances would undercut, albeit in a rela-
tively minor way, the potential for presidential initiative in leading the
nation in an interdependent world.
As mentioned, the formal entrenchment doctrine is part of a more
general intellectual attack on presidential power. The critics should un-
derstand the difficulty of their task. They are not just attacking the
ghost of Richard Nixon, but a deeply-rooted ideology. Moreover, it is
an ideology shared to date by the Congress. The way that Congress has
chosen to translate that ideology into practice is to authorize and toler-
ate presidential initiative. That is the basic constitutional common law
of foreign policy and separation of powers. The President initiates. The
Congress oversees, and reverses if necessary. That was the unnoticed
lesson of the ABM Treaty reinterpretation dispute. By casting the
problem as one of unilateral executive power versus formal Senate or
congressional consent, the formalists overlooked the obvious, and histor-
ically sanctioned, intermediate process of constitutional common law-
making that actually went on in the ABM Treaty interpretation
dispute.
exclusive power, for as I said, it can be checked by the judiciary and the Congress. And
it is limited by the need for concurrence by the other treaty partners and by the disci-
pline provided by the need to justify the new interpretation under accepted forms of
legal analysis. The substantive result of the ABM Treaty reinterpretation caper dem-
onstrates the power of the last three factors.
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